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1
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 1
Amici curiae (listed in the Appendix) are
professors who research and write on the First
Amendment and religious liberty. They have a strong
interest in the proper application of the Religion
Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT
“The First Amendment protects the right of
religious institutions ‘to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’”
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140
S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020). This principle—known as
the church autonomy doctrine—is rooted in the
American constitutional tradition of religious
freedom. Seeking to escape government intrusion in
their churches, the Puritans, Quakers, and other
religious dissenters left England in search of a land
where they could “elect their own ministers and
establish their own modes of worship.” HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012). “It was against this

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amici
curiae certifies that this brief was not authored in whole or in
part by counsel for any party and that no person or entity other
than amici curiae or their counsel have made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. The
parties have received timely notice and have consented to the
filing of this brief.
1
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background that the First Amendment was adopted.”
Id. at 183.
Rooted in both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, the church autonomy doctrine is a
defense that “operates like an immunity from suit as
to certain discrete subject matters that go to a
religious organization’s control over the doctrine,
polity, and personnel that execute its present vision
or determine its future destiny.” Carl H. Esbeck,
After Espinoza, What’s Left of the Establishment
Clause?, 21 Federalist Soc’y Rev. 186, 202 (2020). Far
from offering religious institutions “a general
immunity from secular laws,” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at
2060, however, the doctrine simply “protect[s] their
autonomy with respect to internal management
decisions that are essential to the institution’s
central mission.” Id. It “let[s] the church be the
church.” Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the
Everson Decision and America’s Church-State
Proposition, 23 J.L. & Religion 15, 41 (2008).
This case involves a minister protesting his
dismissal from church leadership after having
“conflicting visions about the growth of the church.”
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). That is precisely the kind of
intrachurch power struggle that implicates the
church autonomy doctrine. Yet the Fifth Circuit
determined that the district court prematurely
dismissed the suit, because it is “not certain that
resolution of McRaney’s claims will require the court
to interfere” with “purely ecclesiastical questions.”
Pet.App.48a (Ho, J.). That decision is mistaken.
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Unlike church property disputes, which may be
decided by “neutral principles” of law, personnel
decisions—by their nature—cannot be decided
simply by “neutral principles.” “As the saying goes,
personnel is policy.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.).
That the minister’s claims are framed under
state tort law is of no moment. The scope of the
church autonomy doctrine encompasses torts that
arise from the minister-church employment
relationship. While immunity may not attach to all
tort claims against a religious organization, it
undoubtably attaches when the claim involves the
hiring, promotion, or firing of a ministerial employee.
Indeed, such claims are substantially similar to
federal nondiscrimination claims, which this Court
has previously decided fall under the church
autonomy doctrine. After all, the purpose of the
doctrine is to prevent the government from
“interfer[ing] with the internal governance of the
church.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. Because
the tort claims here involve internal church
governance, “[t]his case falls right in the heartland of
the church autonomy doctrine.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.).
This Court should grant the petition and reverse the
decision below.
ARGUMENT
I.

The United States has long recognized the
importance of church autonomy.

“[T]he right of religious institutions ‘to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and
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doctrine’” is central to the fabric of American society
and constitutional heritage. Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at
2055 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
“[T]he Religion Clauses protect a private sphere
within which religious bodies are free to govern
themselves in accordance with their own beliefs.”
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
This
principle—that
“religious
communities and institutions enjoy meaningful
autonomy and independence with respect to their
governance, teachings, and doctrines”—dictates that
government may not interfere in internal church
affairs. Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom,
Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial
Exception, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 175, 175
(2011).
A. Church autonomy in England.
The church autonomy doctrine is rooted in the
American constitutional tradition of religious
freedom. In adopting the First Amendment and
honoring the right of churches to govern without
interference, the Founders attempted to “prevent a
repetition of [British] practices” of governmentcontrolled decision making in the church. Our Lady,
140 S. Ct. at 2061. Indeed, those very practices drove
the Puritans, Quakers, and other religious dissenters
out of England.
Magna Carta recognized church autonomy in its
very first clause. J. Holt, Magna Carta App. IV, P.
317, cl. 1 (1965). It decreed that the English church
“shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties
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unimpaired,” including “freedom of elections”—“the
greatest necessity and importance to the English
church.” Id.; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.
Yet in 1215, actual freedom from government
interference “may have been more theoretical than
real.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182; id. at 182
(noting that Henry II ordered the electors of a
bishopric to “hold a free election” but forbade them
from electing “anyone but Richard my clerk”);
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are
Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 515, 524 (2007) (identifying
“constraint[s] to which King John agreed []but did
not always respect”).
The English church faced constant interference
from the Crown in religious decisionmaking. By
1535, the English monarch reigned as supreme head
of the English church, with full authority to appoint
church officials. See The Act of Supremacy of 1534,
26 Hen. 8, ch. 1; The Act in Restraint of Annates, 25
Hen. 8, ch. 20. Subsequent laws continued to stifle
both religious exercise and church autonomy. James
I proclaimed it “the chiefest of all kingly duties ... to
settle the affairs of religion.” Documents Illustrative
of English Church History 513 (Henry Gee &
William John Hardy eds., 1896). Charles I followed
suit by requiring all clergy to swear an oath of
allegiance, “bind[ing] themselves never to consent ‘to
alter the government of th[e] church by archbishops,
bishops, deans and archdeacons, etcetera, as it
stands now established.’” Felix Makower, The
Constitutional History and Constitution of the
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Church of England 76 (1895). Though Charles I lost
his head, Charles II persisted in interfering with the
church: after restoring the monarchy in 1660, he
immediately ordered all ministers to pledge their
allegiance or face being labeled seditious and
removed from their positions. See Act of Uniformity,
1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4.
John Locke strongly opposed this government
interference, arguing that it was “utterly necessary”
to “draw a precise boundary-line between (1) the
affairs of civil government and (2) the affairs of
religion.” John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration
3 (1690) (Bennett ed. 2010). Failure to recognize this
distinction, he warned, would result in endless
“controversies arising between those who have ... a
concern for men’s souls and those who have ... a care
for the commonwealth.” Id. Because government is
“constituted only for the purpose of preserving and
promoting” life, liberty, and property, while the
church “care[s] for the salvation of men’s souls,” id.,
they need different laws. And since members of a
church “joined it freely without coercion ... it follows
that the right of making its laws must belong to the
[church] itself.” Id. at 5.
Yet the promise of church autonomy remained
hollow. England continued to “suffer[] from chronic
religious strife and intolerance.” Michael W.
McConnell,
The
Origins
and
Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1421 (1990). “Seeking to escape
the control of the national church,” the Puritans
crossed the Atlantic, searching for a land where they
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could “elect their own minsters and establish their
own modes of worship.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
182. Other religious dissenters followed. See id. at
183. Even those who adhered to the Church of
England still “chafed at the control exercised by the
Crown.” Id.
B. Church autonomy in the United States.
“It was against this background that the First
Amendment was adopted.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S.
at 183. The centuries-old struggle to free religion
from government meddling spurred the American
commitment “to preserv[ing] a church’s independent
authority” in “matters of faith and doctrine and in
closely linked matters of internal government.” Our
Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. The founding generation
both “sought to foreclose the possibility of a national
church” and ensure that the new federal government
“would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184. Instead, America
would honor the “distinctions between [civil and
religious] spheres, the independence of institution,
and the ‘freedom of the church.’” Garnett, Religion
and Group Rights, supra, 523. It would ensure “a
constitutional order in which the institutions of
religion—not ‘faith,’ ‘religion,’ or ‘spirituality,’ but the
‘church’—are distinct from, other than, and
meaningfully independent of, the institutions of
government.” Id.
Such an order required “rejecting a national
establishment of religion.” Berg et al., supra, 181. In
doing so, “Americans necessarily rejected a role for
the federal government to choose church leaders.” Id.
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“The First Amendment confirms this rejection, as
do early practices and policies.” Id. For example,
shortly after independence, the Vatican asked Barbe
Marbois, the French Minister to the United States
“to petition Congress for approval to appoint a
Catholic bishop in the United States.” Carl H.
Esbeck, Religion During the American Revolution
and the Early Republic, in 1 Law and Religion, An
Overview 57, 72-73 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo
Cristofori, eds. 2013). Congress responded by
directing Benjamin Franklin, the U.S. Minister to
France, to inform the Vatican and the French
Minister that “the subject of [their] application ...
being purely spiritual[] ... is without the jurisdiction
and powers of Congress, who ha[s] no authority to
permit or refuse it.” Id.
Similarly, in 1806, John Carroll, the United
States’ first Catholic bishop, sought then-Secretary of
State James Madison’s view about whom to appoint
as bishop in the newly acquired Louisiana Territory.
Berg et al., supra, 181. “After conferring with
President Jefferson, Madison responded that ‘the
selection of ecclesiastical individuals’—of church
‘functionaries’—was an ‘entirely ecclesiastical’
matter for the Catholic Church to decide, and that he
would adhere to ‘the scrupulous policy of the
Constitution in guarding against a political
interference in religious affairs.’” Id. (quoting Letter
from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20,
1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American
Catholic Historical Society 63-64 (1909)); HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 184.
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Jefferson took a similar view when Madison, as
Secretary of State, informed him in 1804 that local
authorities had shut the doors of a Catholic parish in
the Orleans Territory “in response to a conflict
between two priests concerning who was the rightful
leader of the congregation.” Kevin Pybas,
Disestablishment in the Louisiana and Missouri
Territories, in Disestablishment and Religious
Dissent: Church-State Relations in the New
American States, 1776–1833 273, 281-82 (Esbeck &
Hartog eds., 2019). Displeased, Jefferson wrote back:
“[I]t was an error in our officer to shut the doors of
the church. ... The priests must settle their
differences in their own way, provided they commit
no breach of the peace. ... On our principles all
church-discipline is voluntary; and never to be
enforced by the public authority.” Id.
Jefferson reiterated the point just eight days
later in a letter to the Ursuline Sisters of New
Orleans. “The order’s prioress had written to
Jefferson asking for assurance that the Louisiana
Purchase would not undermine their legal rights.”
Berg et al., supra, 182. Jefferson answered, stating
that “the principles of the Constitution ‘are a sure
guaranty to you that [your property] will be
preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that your
Institution will be permitted to govern itself
according to its own voluntary rules without
interference from the civil authority.’” Id. (citation
omitted). Jefferson emphasized that the Sisters had
a “broad right of self-governance and religious
liberty.” Pybas, supra, 281.
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Madison maintained this principle of noninterference after becoming president. In 1811, he
vetoed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal
Church in Alexandria (which “was then the District
of Columbia”), Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184-85.
In doing so, Madison stated that such a law “exceeds
the rightful authority to which Governments are
limited, by the essential distinction between civil and
religious functions, and violates, in particular, the
article of the Constitution of the United States,
which declares, that ‘Congress shall make no law
respecting a religious establishment.’” Id. (quoting 22
Annals of Cong. 982-983 (1811)). Not only would such
a bill improperly “comprehend[] ... the election and
removal of the Minister” but it would also
“establish[] by law, sundry rules and proceedings
relative purely to the organization and polity of the
church incorporated.” Id.
At bottom, “[w]hat these and other events
confirm is that many early American leaders
embraced the idea of a constitutionalized distinction
between civil and religious authorities.” Richard W.
Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor,
Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure,
2011-2012 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 307, 313. And such a
distinction “implied, and enabled, a zone of
autonomy” over church affairs. Id.
C. Church autonomy is a defense in the
nature of an immunity.
By erecting a barrier between civil authorities
and religious institutions on matters involving
internal church governance, the church autonomy
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doctrine creates a defense in the nature of an
immunity. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4
(“[T]he exception operates as an affirmative defense
to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional
bar.”); Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 202. Once a
court determines the doctrine applies, the inquiry
ends. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95;
Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200.
The church autonomy doctrine “does not mean
that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity
from secular laws.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
“[B]ut it does protect their autonomy with respect to
internal management decisions that are essential to
the institution’s central mission.” Id. It gives
churches “an independence from secular control or
manipulation—in short, power to decide for
themselves” how to govern their affairs. Kedroff, 344
U.S. at 116. Simply put, it “let[s] the church be the
church.” Esbeck, America’s Church-State Proposition,
supra, 41.
Importantly, applying the doctrine does not
require a showing of religious harm or a religious
burden if the immunity is not honored. Rather, a loss
of control over internal governance—a loss of
autonomy—is itself the harm. That is why, for
example, this Court rejected the EEOC’s argument
in Hosanna-Tabor that the school’s proffered
religious reason (insubordination) for firing the
petitioner “was pretextual.” Esbeck, After Espinoza,
supra, 200. The Court explained that such a
“suggestion missed the point,” because the
ministerial exception does not exist “to safeguard a

12
church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is
made for a religious reason.... [t]he exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who
will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly
ecclesiastical,’ ... is the church’s alone.” HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95.
Accordingly, rather than employ a balancing test
to determine whether the government’s interest
justifies interfering in the church’s internal
governance, a categorical immunity applies. See
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195-96. Once a church
determines whether to hire or fire church personnel,
then, “there is no follow-on judicial balancing” of that
decision. Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200. “There
is no balancing because there can be no legally
sufficient
governmental
interest
to
justify
interfering” in a church’s decision not to retain
unwanted personnel. Id. In such a case, “the First
Amendment has struck the balance for us.” HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
To be sure, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor applied
the ministerial exception as a defense by a religious
employer that had been sued by an employee,
whereas in this case the North American Mission
Board did not directly employ Dr. McRaney. Pet.8-10.
But the employer-employee relationship does not
define the bounds of the church autonomy doctrine.
The ministerial exception is “a subset of the church
autonomy doctrine,” which more broadly shields all
matters of internal church governance from judicial
intrusion. Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 201. The
doctrine includes, for example, the prohibition on
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courts taking up questions of religious doctrine or
determining who may be admitted or expelled from
membership. Those determinations are left to a
religious entity itself to adjudicate. See infra Section
II.A. These are not unique free-standing areas of law;
they all fall under the heading of church autonomy
doctrine.
At bottom, church autonomy is a freedom of a
religious organization to govern its internal affairs
without interference by government. It is a defense
that “operates like an immunity from suit as to
certain discrete subject matters that go to a religious
organization’s control over the doctrine, polity, and
personnel that execute its present vision or
determine its future destiny.” Esbeck, After
Espinoza, supra, 202; see also Victor E. Schwartz &
Christopher E. Appel, The Church Immunity
Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 431, 453 (2011).
D. This Court has properly treated church
autonomy as a unique area of law.
Although the church autonomy doctrine is
“rooted in the Religion Clauses,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. at 190, those clauses “each have their own line
of cases.” Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 196. So
under
the
First
Amendment,
there
are
Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise Clause
cases, and a separate line of church autonomy cases.
Id. This “distinct, third line of cases … tracks the
development of church autonomy.” Id.
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This Court first articulated the church autonomy
doctrine in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1871). Declining to rule in a doctrinal dispute
between factions of the Presbyterian Church, the
Court held that “whenever the questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such
decisions as final, and as binding on them.” Id. at
727. It emphasized the “unquestioned” right of
“voluntary religious associations” to decide for
themselves “controverted questions of faith” and
matters of “ecclesiastical government.” Id. at 728-29.
In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the Court
grounded the doctrine in the First Amendment. It
held that a statute transferring authority and
property in the Russian Orthodox Church violated
the First Amendment because “[l]egislation that
regulates church administration, the operation of the
churches, [or] the appointment of clergy … prohibits
the free exercise of religion” and “violates our rule of
separation between church and state.” 344 U.S. at
107-08, 110. The Court further explained that
America offers “a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control
or manipulation, in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.” Id. at 116.
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), this Court “held
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that the rule of church autonomy from Watson was
now a First Amendment principle.” Esbeck, After
Espinoza, supra, 197. In declining to decide “a church
property dispute which arose when two local
churches withdrew from a hierarchical general
church organization,” a unanimous Court concluded
that the “American concept of the relationship
between church and state ... leaves the civil court no
role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the
process of resolving property disputes.” Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. at 441, 445, 447. 2
Seven years later, in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court

2 The Court has held that courts may employ “neutral
principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property
dispute.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). In such
cases, courts have the option to “examine certain religious
documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust
in favor of the general church.” Id. at 604. “Because churches
could freely structure their property arrangements as they
wanted, courts could use general principles of property law to
discern where the church would have wanted the property to go
in the event of a split.” Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 N.w.
Univ. L. Rev. 1183, 1201 (2014). But neutral principles do not
allow courts to cast away religious autonomy concerns
“whenever an ostensibly neutral or secular principle or policy
seems relevant.” W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, 1 Rel.
Organization & the Law § 5:16 (2017). In particular, in
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court “clearly thought Jones[‘ neutral
principle rule] irrelevant” because it was an employment, not a
property, case. Lund, supra, 1201.
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“rejected an Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a
top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and
his removal from office.” Esbeck, After Espinoza,
supra, 197. The Court determined that accepting
jurisdiction over such a subject matter, would be
“[in]consistent with the constitutional mandate that
the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of
the highest judicatories of a religious organization of
hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. The Court
deemed any “detailed review” of internal church
governance decisions “impermissible under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 718.
More than three decades later, in HosannaTabor, this Court unanimously rejected a teacher’s
challenge to her dismissal from a religious school
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Applying
the ministerial exception, the Court held that the
church autonomy doctrine barred the teacher’s claim
because “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing
to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the
church of control over the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
188.
In doing so, the Court affirmed that these
previous church autonomy decisions are distinct from
the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause line of
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cases. This is why, for example, this Court has
rejected the argument that Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), “precludes recognition of a
ministerial exception.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
189. The Court “dismissed this argument as having
‘no merit’” and noted that “Smith does not govern
‘internal church decision[s] that affect[] the faith and
mission of the church itself.’” Pet.App.55a (Ho, J.).
Finally, just last term, this Court again held that
the ministerial exception—“a subpart of the more
encompassing
‘general
principle
of
church
autonomy,’” Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 201
(quoting 140 S. Ct. at 2061)—barred federal
employment discrimination claims by two teachers at
Catholic schools. The Court reaffirmed that “[t]he
independence of religious institutions in matters of
‘faith and doctrine’ is linked to independence in ...
‘matters of church government.’” 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
And the First Amendment protects “autonomy with
respect to internal management decisions that are
essential to [a religious] institution’s central
mission.” Id.
II. The
church
autonomy
doctrine
encompasses torts arising from the
minister-church employment relationship.
A. The scope
doctrine.

of

the

church

autonomy

The purpose of the church autonomy doctrine is
to prevent the government from “interfer[ing] with
the internal governance of the church.” Hosanna-
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Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. Precedent teaches that
“internal governance” generally includes five subject
areas where “civil officials have been barred
categorically from exercising [authority].” See
Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200 & nn. 174-77
First, civil courts cannot decide “questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law,” which are left to a religious entity itself to
adjudicate. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
Although “[i]ntrafaith differences … are not
uncommon among followers of a particular creed, …
the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to
resolve such differences in relation to the Religion
Clauses.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). This Court has never
wavered in its admonition that “civil courts [have] no
role in determining ecclesiastical questions.”
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 447 (emphasis
added). “Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. Nor may
they “resolv[e] underlying controversies over
religious doctrine.” Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at
449.
Second, courts generally cannot interfere with
the polity of a religious organization. See HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 187. “To permit civil courts to
probe deeply enough into the allocation of power
within a hierarchical church so as to decide …
religious law governing church polity … would
violate the First Amendment in much the same
manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.”
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709 (citation omitted). Here,
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“Baptist ecclesiology is non-hierarchical [and]
spiritual
authority
rests
with
individual
congregations that then partner with one another to
advance gospel work on a broader scale.” Pet.5. But
the church-autonomy doctrine does not protect only
hierarchical churches. Courts may not “privilege[]
religious traditions with formal organizational
structures over those that are less formal.” Our
Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2064. Indeed, there is no reason
why a church’s right “‘to establish their own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and
government,’” to “control … the selection of those
who will personify its beliefs,” or to decide “who will
minister to the faithful” should extend only to those
churches with a hierarchical structure. See HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 187-88, 195. No matter a church’s
structure, courts cannot “engage in the forbidden
process of interpreting and weighing church
doctrine.” See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 451.
Nor can they “impermissibly substitute [their] own
inquiry into church polity,” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at
708, or “[b]y fiat … displace[] one church
administrator with another,” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at
119. Such an action “intrudes … the power of the
state into the forbidden area of religious freedom
contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.”
Id.
Third, the church autonomy doctrine prohibits
courts from “depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs,”
precluding judicial interference with ministerial
employment
relationships,
including
the
appointment, promotion, and termination decisions
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of the religious entity. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at
188. Simply put, “the ‘[f]reedom to select the clergy,
where no improper methods of choice are proven,’ is
‘part of the free exercise of religion’ protected by the
First Amendment against government interference.”
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186. So too are decisions
to remove a clergy member. See Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 708-20. These principles formed the
foundation for the Court’s holding that “the First
Amendment … precludes application of [employment
discrimination] legislation to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. at 188. As the Court recently summarized, “a
church’s independence on matters ‘of faith and
doctrine’ requires the authority to select, supervise,
and if necessary, remove a minister without
interference by secular authorities.” Our Lady, 140
S. Ct. at 2060.
Fourth, the church autonomy doctrine covers
church membership decisions, including admission,
discipline, and expulsion. A church’s “very existence
is dedicated to the collective expression and
propagation of shared religious ideals.” HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
Therefore, “[f]orcing a [church] to accept certain
members may impair [its ability] to express those
views, and only those views, that it intends to
express.” Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 648 (2000)); see also Bouldin v. Alexander,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40 (1872) (“[W]e have no
power to revise or question ordinary acts of church
discipline, or of excision from membership. … [W]e
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cannot decide who ought to be members of the
church, nor whether the excommunicated have been
regularly or irregularly cut off.”); Watson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 733 (recognizing that matters “concern[ing]
theological
controversy,
church
discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
members of the church to the standard of morals
required of them” are those “over which the civil
courts exercise no jurisdiction”).
Fifth, internal communications regarding the
subject areas described above—faith and doctrine,
church
polity,
employment
decisions,
and
membership decisions—cannot give rise to liability.
See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo.,
289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002). In Bryce, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of two civil rights
suits predicated on statements that allegedly
constituted sexual harassment. Id. at 653, 659. The
case involved the termination of a youth minister
after she entered a same-sex civil union against
church doctrine. Id. at 651-52. Specifically, the
minister
and
her
partner
alleged
that
communications within the church amounted to a
civil rights conspiracy violation against the partner,
an individual not employed by the church. See id. at
657-58. But because the “letters to other church
leaders discussed an internal church personnel
matter and the doctrinal reasons for [the] personnel
decision” and were “part of an internal ecclesiastical
dispute,” the court found that “[t]he defendants’
alleged statements f[ell] squarely within the areas of
church governance and doctrine protected by the
First Amendment.” Id. at 658-59.
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B. The tort claims here fall squarely within
the church autonomy doctrine.
Several of these subject areas are implicated
here. At issue are three tort claims that arise from
an employment-related ministerial dispute. Dr. Will
McRaney is a former Southern Baptist minister and
leader
of
the
Baptist
Convention
of
Maryland/Delaware (BCMD), one of denomination’s
“state conventions.” In that position he “guided the
direction of the ministry and organization,”
“screen[ed] and manag[ed] all staff,” and represented
BCMD in negotiations with the North American
Mission Board. Pet.App.47a (Ho, J.). In 2014, he sued
the North American Mission Board, a subdivision of
the Southern Baptist
Convention, after the
Convention fired him from church leadership
because of his “conflicting visions” with the Mission
Board “about the growth of the church.” See
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). Because such issues involve
internal church governance, “[t]his case falls right in
the heartland of the church autonomy doctrine.” Id.
The essential facts are undisputed. Dr. McRaney,
an ordained minister, disagreed with the North
American Mission Board about a strategic
partnership agreement (SPA) between them. Pet.6.
In 2014, the “Mission Board proposed changes to the
SPA that, in Reverend McRaney’s view, gave the
SBC Mission Board more control over state
conventions” like the one he helped lead. Id. By his
own admission, McRaney “consistently declined to
accept” the new SPA, which addressed several
church policies. Id. Because of this refusal, the
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Mission Board notified the BCMD that it would
cancel the existing SPA. Id. The BCMD, in turn,
dismissed McRaney from his church leadership
position. Pet.6-7. Following his termination, the
hosts of a large symposium also disinvited McRaney
as a speaker for an event at which he expected to sell
a book he authored. Pet.7. He contended that this
was a direct “result of ‘interference’ by employees of
the SBC Mission Board.” Id. McRaney then sued the
Mission
Board
for
defamation,
intentional
interference with business relationships, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. He
claimed that the Mission Board made “false and
libelous accusation[s] against him,” “threatened to
withhold funding from the BCMD unless [he] was
terminated,” and lobbied to have him “disinvited as a
speaker” at the mission symposium. Pet.6-7.
The district court dismissed the suit, concluding
that McRaney’s claims would require the court to
determine whether the Mission Board had “valid
religious reason[s]” for its actions. Pet.App.38a, 41a.
But the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
McRaney had “ask[ed] the court to apply neutral
principles of tort law to a case that, on the face of the
complaint, involves a civil rather than religious
dispute.” Pet.App.5a. The court ultimately concluded
that “[t]he district court’s dismissal was premature”
because it is “not certain that resolution of
McRaney’s claims will require the court to interfere”
with “purely ecclesiastical questions.” Pet.App.5a, 8a.
That decision is mistaken.
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By concluding that the tort claims might be
adjudicated based on “neutral principles of tort law,”
the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted this Court’s church
autonomy jurisprudence generally and the “neutral
principles” rule specifically. See, e.g., supra n.4
(noting that “neutral principles” does not allow
courts to cast away religious autonomy concerns
“whenever an ostensibly neutral or secular principle
or policy seems relevant”); see also Lund, supra, 1201
(explaining that in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court
“clearly thought Jones[’s neutral principle rule]
irrelevant” since it was an employment, not a
property case). A loss of control over internal
governance—a loss of sovereignty within the
protected sphere—is itself the harm the church
autonomy doctrine protects.
This Court’s recent cases are instructive.
Although Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady addressed
the church autonomy doctrine’s application in federal
employment discrimination laws, their reasoning
applies with equal force here. First, as a
constitutional doctrine “grounded in the Religion
Clauses,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190, and
incorporated against the states, Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the church autonomy
doctrine applies equally to federal and state claims.
Moreover, the state tort law claims here present
precisely the same constitutional concerns as
employment discrimination claims. “Allowing secular
courts to punish religious organizations with
damages awards for tortiously interfering with a
minister’s church employment infringes on ‘a
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religious group’s right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments,’ in violation of the
Free Exercise Clause.” Pet.20 (quoting HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89). And “[t]ort damages
awards to clergy contesting ministerial employment
decisions, in effect, accord ‘the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the
faithful,’ in violation of the Establishment Clause.”
Id.
At bottom, “[a] former Southern Baptist minister
brought this suit to protest his dismissal from church
leadership.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). “That fact alone
should be enough to bar this suit.” Id. The church
autonomy doctrine does not immunize all conduct
arising from church operations from state tort
liability. “[R]egular tort rules,” for example, “apply to
someone hit by the church bus or by a falling
gargoyle.” Lund, supra, 1204. It does, however,
categorically immunize actions concerning who
should be in leadership and what actions they should
take on behalf of the church. That is precisely the
situation here.
In his complaint, McRaney acknowledges that he
“was dismissed because he ‘consistently declined to
accept’ church policy regarding ‘the specific area of
starting new churches, including the selection,
assessing and training of church planters.’”
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). He even admitted that his
“cause of action had its roots in Church policy.” Id.
Indeed, in his view, it was “a battle of power and
authority between two religious organizations”—the
Mission Board and the BCMD. Pet.8. Moreover,
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McRaney alleged that the actions that gave rise to
his claims were “a direct result of [his] refusal to
accept the new SPA”—an agreement that directly
concerned various church policies. Pet.App.47a (Ho,
J.). These are precisely the kind of intrachurch power
struggles that implicate the church autonomy
doctrine.
Because the alleged misconduct fits squarely
within the categories of conduct shielded by the
church autonomy doctrine, the judicial entanglement
must end there. The Fifth Circuit’s wait-and-see
approach invites judicial scrutiny into ecclesiastical
matters. But “[t]he First Amendment outlaws such
intrusion.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, amici respectfully request
that this Court grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari and reverse the decision below.
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